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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2366
___________
JACQUELYN N’JAI,
Appellant
vs.
MR. HOMER C. FLOYD; STEPHEN A. GLASSMAN; RAQUEL OTERODE
YIENGST; ROBERT FLIPPING; MICHAEL HARDIMAN; MANUEL B. ZUNIGA, Jr.;
WILKINSBURG SCHOOL DISTRICT; PA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Pittsburgh, PA; HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION, Harrisburg, PA; EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Pittsburgh; PITTSBURGH BOARD OF PUBLIC
EDUCATION; SUE GOODWIN 
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-1506)
District Judge:  Honorable Nora Barry Fischer
_____________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
September 30, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, WEIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 16, 2008)
______________
OPINION
______________
2PER CURIAM.
Jacquelyn N’Jai, proceeding pro se, appeals the April 4, 2008 order of the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing her
complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute.  See Fed. Rule of Civ. Pro. 41(b).  We
will summarily vacate the District Court’s order and remand for further proceedings.
In a series of orders entered on March 3 and March 5, 2008, the District
Court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  In particular,
the District Court dismissed the majority of J’Nai’s claims with prejudice.  But,
concluding that J’Nai’s complaint “lack[ed] clarity” and “sufficient detail,” the District
Court in part disposed of the motions to dismiss without prejudice, granting J’Nai leave to
amend her complaint on or before April 3, 2008.  See Phillips v. County of Allegheny,
515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8’s pleading standards in light of
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, – U.S. –, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)).  J’Nai failed to file an
amended complaint.  The District Court dismissed the action for failure to prosecute on
April 4, 2003. 
We review the District Court’s order for abuse of discretion.  See Emerson
v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).  “While we defer to the District
Court’s discretion, dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances
and doubts should be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.”  Id.  We
have emphasized that “dismissal is a drastic sanction and should be reserved for those
3cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” 
Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982).
Before entering a punitive dismissal, the District Court is required to make
explicit findings regarding the factors enumerated in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 747 F.2d 863, 869 (3d Cir. 1984).  See Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71,
74 (3d Cir. 1987); see also United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d
141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We have opined that [the Poulis factors] must be weighed by a
District Court in determining whether the harsh sanction of dismissal is justified.”).  The
Poulis factors that the District Court must consider are: 
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the
prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet
scheduling orders . . .; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4)
whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad
faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal,
which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the
meritoriousness of the claim.
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. 
This Court’s function is to determine whether the District Court properly
balanced the Poulis factors and whether the record supports its findings.  See Livera v.
First Nat. State Bank of New Jersey, 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hicks v.
Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir.1988)); see also Emcasco, 834 F.2d at 74 (noting that “[i]n
order that we may properly exercise our function of reviewing for abuse of discretion, we
have [] required the district court to make explicit findings concerning the factors it must
      On remand, the District Court may wish to consider J’Nai’s notice of appeal and her1
“Response . . . Regarding Frivolousness,” filed in this Court on June 20, 2008, in which
she alleges that she attempted to submit a timely motion for an enlargement of time in
which to file her amended complaint.  We express no opinion on the merit of this
allegation or the evidence submitted in support of it.
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consider in rendering judgment by . . . dismissal”).  Here, however, the District Court did
not conduct any Poulis analysis.  We thus conclude that the District Court erred in
dismissing N’Jai’s complaint without making the requisite findings.  Livera, 879 F.2d at
1193.  Given the record presented, we will forego the opportunity to conduct our own
Poulis test as it would require factual findings not within the parameters of our review. 
See id. at 1194.  
By failing to conduct a Poulis balancing test, the District Court abused its
discretion; therefore, a remand to the District Court for consideration of the Poulis factors
is necessary.  See id. at 1188.  Accordingly, we will summarily vacate the District Court’s
order entered April 4, 2008 and will remand the case to the District Court for further
proceedings.1
